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1Abstract
During the recent anthrax attacks, the country's supply of anthrax vaccine was dangerously low. The reasons
for this were (1) the failure of the FDA, the Defense Department, and its contractor, BioPort Corporation,
to plan adequately to ensure the production of a consistent supply of the vaccine in accordance with the
FDA regulatory process; and (2) the reliance of the Defense Department on a single private supplier of the
vaccine with serious nancial problems. Careful planning should be employed to prevent such a situation
with other biological products which may be needed to save lives during bioterrorist attacks.
Introduction
In October of 2001, shortly after the September 11 attacks, ve people died and thirteen others became
infected with the anthrax disease after envelopes containing anthrax spores were placed in the mail. During
this crisis, due to production problems, the anthrax vaccine was in such short supply that there was not
even enough to vaccinate those troops whose inoculation had been planned for a number of years. While the
Defense Department's contractor has recently been allowed to release anthrax vaccine again, the country's
experience with the anthrax vaccine should not be repeated. Anthrax disease, while the most prominent in
the news, is not even the only bioterrorism threat that the country faces. Besides anthrax, the Centers for
Disease Control has identied seventeen other diseases which are credible threats for a biological attack.1
Analysis of the anthrax vaccine situation shows that FDA, the Defense Department, and its contractors all
need to plan more carefully in the future to avoid similar shortages of biological products to ght bioterrorism.
About Anthrax
Anthrax, a disease caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, has been described by the American Forces
Information Service as the \poor man's atomic bomb."2 Unlike the atomic bomb, anthrax can be turned
1See U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Biological Diseases/Agents Listing, visited on March 14, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Agentlist.asp.
2Douglas J. Gillert, Anthrax Vaccine Called Eective Force Protection 3 (November 1998), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1998/n11051998 9811051.html.
2into a weapon of mass destruction by persons with a relatively low skill level.3 The Congressional Oce
of Technology Assessment estimated in 1993 that 100 kilograms of anthrax, released into the wind towards
Washington, D.C., could kill between 130,000 and 3 million people.4
The anthrax bacterium, once released in the air, is invisible, has no smell or taste, and produces ulike
symptoms, and therefore anthrax outbreaks are not easily detected.5 Persons with anthrax may not seek
medical care until the disease is untreatable.6 The vast majority of those infected with inhalation anthrax
die within a few days of exposure.7
The Anthrax Vaccine
Currently, the only preventive measure against anthrax is the anthrax vaccine.8 Antibiotics such as Cipro
have been successful in treating the infection once contracted, and it has been suggested that they may have
some preventive use as well if taken during an anthrax attack.9 However, this use of Cipro is still exper-
imental, having been discovered by scientists studying widespread treatment of postal and media workers
with Cipro during the October 2001 terrorist mailings of envelopes containing anthrax.10
The current anthrax vaccine is known as Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed or AVA. The vaccine must be given
3See id.
4See Thomas V. Inglesby, M.D., et. al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 281 JAMA 1735 (1999), available at
http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v281n18/ffull/jst80027, citing Oce of Technology Assessment, US Congress, Prolif-
eration of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Publication OTA-ISC-559 (1993) at 53-55.
5See Hearing on Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
2(April 13, 2000)(statement of Rudy de Leon, Deputy Secretary of Defense), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2000/s20000413-depsecdef.html.
6See id.
7See id.
8See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Anthrax 1, January 24, 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaccine/anthrax/htm.
9See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Antibiotics Found to Have Helped Limit Anthrax Infections, The New York Times, March 8,
2002, at A12.
10See id.
3in a series of six shots over the course of eighteen months, with yearly booster shots thereafter to maintain
immunity.11 Researchers are also looking into giving the anthrax vaccine after exposure to prevent infection,
or giving fewer shots, but those uses are considered experimental.12
The Defense Department's vaccination program, called the Anthrax Vaccine Inoculation Program, or AVIP,
has been very controversial.13 The Defense Department has been subject to numerous lawsuits from service
members claiming injury from the vaccine.14 The Defense Department has also court-martialed over one
hundred service members who refused the vaccine.15
BioPort Corporation
The vaccine used for the Defense Department program is purchased from BioPort Corporation, the only
manufacturer of the anthrax vaccine licensed in the United States.16 AVA was previously manufactured by
the State of Michigan, which manufactured the vaccine since 1970, most recently in its Michigan Biologic
Products Institute (MBPI).17 The State of Michigan decided in 1998 to sell the facility and turn the devel-
opment of these vaccines over to private enterprise.18 The state therefore created a corporate entity which
11See The National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine, Anthrax Vaccine is Useful But Shortcomings Underscore Need for Replacement
1 (March 6, 2002), available at http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309083095?OpenDocument.
12See id. at 2.
13This paper does not purport to examine in detail whether the anthrax vaccine is or is not safe. Instead, this paper focuses
on the problems which arose after the Defense Department decided that the vaccine was needed for the national defense and
tried to procure it.
14See, e.g., Minns v. United States, 974 F.Supp. 500 (D.Md. 1997)(claiming that the anthrax vaccine caused birth defects
in male service members' children).
15See Laura Johannes, Worries About Safety of Its Anthrax Vaccine Put the Army in a Bind, The Wall Street Journal, Oc-
tober 12, 2001, at A1.
16See Nancy Kingsbury. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Aairs, and International
Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives 1. October 23, 2001, available at http://www.gao.gov/.
17See id. at 1.
18See Field Hearing on Department of Defense Anti-Biological Warfare Agent Vaccine Acquisition Program at Pine Blu,
Arkansas, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel 3 (2000)(statement by Dr.
Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense).
4owned the vaccine facilities and which could be sold to private entities.19 BioPort purchased the entity in
1998.20
Until the end of January 2002, BioPort had not had a batch of anthrax vaccine released by the FDA since
November 2, 1999.21 In 1996, the FDA threatened to revoke the license of MBPI to manufacture anthrax
due to \numerous signicant violations of the FD&C Act, FDA's regulations and the standards in MBPI's
license."22 In response to the threatened revocation, MPPI prepared a \Strategic Plan for Compliance" in
1997 which BioPort agreed to follow when it purchased the facility in 1998.23
The State of Michigan, prior to the sale of the facility to BioPort, had begun renovations on the facility.24
Therefore, BioPort needed to obtain a license application supplement for the new facility in order to begin
marketing anthrax vaccine.25 When the facility began producing new batches of the anthrax vaccine, FDA
inspectors found numerous problems and did not approve the licensing supplement.26 FDA's November 1999
inspection of BioPort found problems with \validation, failure to investigate, deviation reporting, standard
operating procedures, stability testing, and environmental monitoring."27 BioPort's license application sup-
plements were not fully approved, and new lots of vaccine could not be released, until January 31, 2002.28
On that date, three lots of vaccine submitted to the FDA pre-approval were released.29
19See Department of Defense, Anthrax Vaccine|Production Issues 1, visited on March 10, 2002, available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/qna/PRODISSUES.HTM.
20See id.
21See Department of Defense, Lot Documents, visited on March 10, 2002, available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/lot documents/INDEXlot documents/LOT DOCUMENTS/ and Kathryn C. Zoon,
Ph.D., Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Letter to Robert C. Meyers of BioPort Corporation, November
2, 1999, available at http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/lot documents/Release/FDA48.gif.
22Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D., Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Statement Before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services 5, July 12, 2000, available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2000/anthraxvaccine2.html.
23See id.
24See id.
25See id.
26See id.
27See id. at 6.
28See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Approves License Supplements for Anthrax Vaccine, January 31, 2002,
available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2002/NEW00792.html.
29See id.
5BioPort is the only U.S. company which is able to produce the anthrax vaccine.30 Some other countries are
able to produce the anthrax vaccine, such as the United Kingdom and Russia.31 However, BioPort holds
the only license to market the vaccine in the United States.32
The Anthrax Vaccine Shortage
Prior to this latest batch release, all of the batches released by BioPort were prepared by the State of
Michigan prior to the transfer of the facility to the private company.33 Therefore, BioPort did not release
any new vaccine for a period of over two years.
This is especially signicant because the post-shipping shelf life of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed is only two
years.34 The regulation mandating the shelf life also permits the manufacturer to store the vaccine for up
to one year before shipping.35 However, the permissible additional one-year storage period had probably
been run before the November 1999 lot was shipped, as the State of Michigan began its renovations in early
1999. News reports have stated that, until this January, BioPort has never had a batch of its own Anthrax
Vaccine Adsorbed approved by the FDA. Instead, it relied on the batches previously prepared by the State
of Michigan, which turned the facility over to BioPort in 1998.36
30See Kingsbury, supra note 16, at 1.
31See Kingsbury, supra note 16, at 7; see also Warren Strugatch, L.I. @ Work; A Company's Founder Fights For His Brainchild,
The New York Times, February 3, 2002 at 14LI5.
32See Department of Defense, Anthrax Vaccine|Production Issues 1, visited on March 10, 2002, available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/qna/PRODISSUES.HTM.
33See Richard Klausner, Special Adviser, President for Counterterrorism Council of the Institute of Medicine, Prepared
Testimony Before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Federal News Service (February 5, 2002),
available via Lexis-Nexis.
34See 21 C.F.R. x 610.53(c).
35See id.
36See Richard Klausner, Special Adviser, President for Counterterrorism Council of the Institute of Medicine, Prepared
Testimony Before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Federal News Service (February 5, 2002),
available via Lexis-Nexis.
6Indeed, this raises the uncomfortable question of whether the government's stockpile of Anthrax Vaccine
Adsorbed was actually, for a period of about two months, entirely expired. This in a situation in which
anthrax had recently been used as a weapon against the American civilian population.
According to informational material on the FDA website, it is possible to extend the expiration date of a
vaccine.37 Section 21 C.F.R. x 610.53(b) states that \[t]he dating period for a product shall begin on the
date of manufacture, as prescribed in x 610.50." The \dating period" is dened in 21 C.F.R. x 600.3(l) as
\the period beyond which the product cannot be expected beyond reasonable doubt to yield its specied
results." 38 The \expiration date" is dened as \the calendar month and year, and where applicable, the
day and hour, that the dating period ends."39
Changing the date of manufacture is actually possible and has been done in the past with the anthrax
vaccine.40 One does so by changing the date of manufacture after the fact, within the constraints of FDA
regulations. As seen above, the language of 21 C.F.R. x 610.53(b) states that the date of manufacture must
comply with the requirements of 21 C.F.R. x 610.50.41 That section states:
610.50 Date of manufacture.
The date of manufacture shall be determined as follows:
(a) For products for which an ocial standard of potency is prescribed in either x 610.20
or x 610.21, or which are subject to ocial potency tests, the date of initiation by the
manufacturer of the last valid potency test.
(b) For products that are not subject to ocial potency tests, (1) the date of removal from
animals, (2) the date of extraction, (3) the date of solution, (4) the date of cessation of
growth, or (5) the date of nal sterile ltration of a bulk solution, whichever is applicable.42
37See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Vaccine Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), January 3, 2001, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq/vacfaq.htm.
3821 C.F.R. x 600.3(l)
3921 C.F.R. x 600.3(m).
40See Ronald R. Blanck, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Surgeon General, Letter to the Editor. Belleville (IL) News-Democrat
(May 29, 1998), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/other info/blanck.html.
41See 21 C.F.R. x 610.53(b).
7This permits the manufacturer to extend the date of manufacture by performing a \valid potency test" under
the regulation.43 Potency is interpreted in the biologics regulations as:
...the specic ability or capacity of the product, as indicated by appropriate laboratory
tests or by adequately controlled clinical data obtained through the administration of the
product in the manner intended, to eect a given result.44
However, extension of the expiration date by means of a potency test is by no means guaranteed. It is
possible that FDA dating periods are intended to be conservative. However, the language of the regulations
setting the dating period leaves little room for expectations that the vaccine will last much longer than the
dating period. The denition of \dating period" cited above suggests that, when the FDA sets the dating
period, it must have a reasonable relation to the expected life of the vaccine.45
Furthermore, continuing to extend the dating period may have implications for the ecacy of the vaccine
and the willingness of people to take it. Some FDA scientists have raised questions about whether vaccines
necessarily are proved potent even if they have passed a potency test.46 Reliance on expiration date extensions
may also appear to conrm the suspicions of those who are already reluctant to take the vaccine due to safety
concerns, and make them even more reluctant to take the vaccine to protect themselves from the anthrax
disease. For instance, one anti-anthrax vaccine website features prominently a picture of a vial of anthrax
vaccine, with the expiration dates repeatedly crossed out and new ones written in.47
However, even if the vaccine itself remains potent, the acceptability of a potency test is still not a foregone
conclusion. According to the language of x 610.50, the last potency test must be \valid."48 On its website,
43U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Vaccine Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), January 3, 2001, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq/vacfaq.htm.
45See 21 C.F.R. x 600.3(l)
46See Bruce D. Meade and Juan L. Arciniega, Ecacy and Safety of New Products: Assays and Laboratory Markers of
Immunological Importance, Summary of Presentation Given on December 6, 2000 at Medical Defense Against Bioterrorism
Workshop, available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/summaries/120600bio12BM.htm.
47Anthrax Vaccine Links and Information, available at http://www.dallasnw.quik.com/cyberella/index.htm
4821 C.F.R. x 610.50.
8the FDA suggests how it interprets this word in the regulation:
Any decision made to extend the dating period of a vaccine is predicated and sustained by
the data submitted by the manufacturer that veries the sterility and potency of the product.
If the manufacturer can assure FDA, through sound scientic data, that the product is still
sterile and potent even after the recommended dating period then (on a case-by-case basis)
extending the dating period on the label will be permitted.49
This statement makes clear that not all potency tests will be approved by the FDA. Moreover, the FDA's
criteria for approving the potency test suggests that it was not reasonable to expect that BioPort would
easily produce potency tests acceptable to the FDA. In its inspections of the BioPort facility pre-approval,
the FDA inspectors repeatedly noted that BioPort had diculties with record-keeping and maintaining
sterile conditions.50
It is true that the FDA's authority to bind regulated parties to this statement, which appears on a website
and not in the Federal Register, is questionable. Under United States v. Mead, agencies' interpretations of
the organic statute without proper procedure has only persuasive value for courts.51 However, this problem
is purely academic as it would take far too long to litigate to be useful in a situation in which vaccine is due
to expire soon. Furthermore, a company with a history of regulatory problems and a controversial product
dependent on government funding might not want to take on the FDA in court. Even if the manufacturer did
win, the danger of negative publicity would be so great that the Defense Department might nd it politically
unwise to give it future defense contracts.
Relying on potency tests to extend the life of the vaccine, and thus assure a continuous supply, is therefore
at best a gamble. It should not have been relied upon for a crucial supply of vaccine from a sole supplier.
50See, e.g., Paula A. Trost, Marsha W. Major, and William D. Tingley. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service, Food and Drug Administration. Form FDA 483 for BioPort Corporation 4. October 26, 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov/.
51See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
9The Defense Department could conceivably have found itself with no unexpired vaccine under this scenario.
Regardless of expiration dates, military stockpiles of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed were allowed to run danger-
ously low. On November 30, 2001, Kenneth Bacon of the Defense Department conrmed that the Department
had only 60,000 vials of the vaccine available for current use, plus an unspecied \reserve."52 According
to the package insert for Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed at the time, each vial contained 10 doses each.53 In
phase one alone of the military's vaccination program, 75,000 doses a month were required merely to cover
all troops deployed to the Persian Gulf or Korea.54
Furthermore, those in the military are not the only ones who are likely to be on the front lines in case of an
anthrax attack. Currently, BioPort recommends vaccinating emergency response workers, who would likely
be the rst to respond to a domestic terrorist attack.55 The Defense Department also wanted to make the
anthrax vaccine available to South Korea in order to discourage an anthrax attack there.56 There were also
small amounts of the anthrax vaccine sold to the State Department and to persons working with animals
likely to be infected with anthrax.57 However, since the Defense Department currently owns all of the vaccine
being produced by BioPort, those workers cannot be supplied with the vaccine until after BioPort fullls its
obligation to the Defense Department.58 And in case of a mass attack on the American civilian population, a
shortage of anthrax vaccine could have dire results. When the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies ran an exercise simulating a biological attack upon the United States (in this case using smallpox),
52U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Brieng 18, November 30, 2000, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11302000 t1130asd.html.
53See BioPort Corporation, Label for Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed 3 (March 1999) available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/articles/INDEXclinical/package insert.htm.
54See U.S. Department of Defense, Brieng on the Anthrax Vaccination and Immunization Program 3, (December
13, 1999)(statement of Major General Randall L. West, U.S. Marine Corps, Special Advisor to the Un-
der Secretary of Defense of Personnel and Readiness on Anthrax and Biological Defense Matters), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t121419999 t213anth.html.
55See Sue Ellen Christian, Maker of Anthrax Vaccine Gets OK to Supply Military, Chicago Tribune, February 1, 2002, at 8.
56See U.S. Department of Defense, Brieng on the Anthrax Vaccination and Immunization Program 4, (December
13, 1999)(statement of Major General Randall L. West, U.S. Marine Corps, Special Advisor to the Un-
der Secretary of Defense of Personnel and Readiness on Anthrax and Biological Defense Matters), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t121419999 t213anth.html.
57See id.
58See id.
10the Center concluded that \The lack of sucient vaccine or drugs to prevent the spread of disease severely
limited management options," including containing the spread of disease and preventing public panic.59
The Defense Department did reduce its usage of the vaccine, starting in 2000, in direct response to the
problem of a vaccine shortage. 60 However, this meant not vaccinating many troops, including those in the
vicinity of North Korea.61 That area had previously judged to be a high-risk area for an anthrax attack due
to North Korea's possession of biological weaponry.62
In June of 2001, the Defense Department stopped being able to vaccinate all troops headed for Southwest
Asia.63 Iraq is currently known to possess weaponized anthrax.64 After the curtailment of vaccinations in
Southwest Asia, Marine Major General Randall West expressed regret at being unable to vaccinate those
troops and suggested that a lack of a vaccination program in Southwest Asia might be endangering American
troops.65 At the time of writing of this paper, the only persons the Defense Department was vaccinating
were \small special operations units" and persons participating in research.66
However, curtailing usage, while it would keep the stores from running low, would not solve the problem of
expiration dates. The Institute of Medicine has recommended further research into a vaccine which would
remain potent for longer periods so that it could be more easily stockpiled by the government.67 However,
this could take years to develop. Until then, it is necessary to work with the constraints posed by the current
59Tara O'Toole, M.D., MPH, et al., Shining Light on Dark Winter 4, available at
http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/lessons.html.
60See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Brieng 1, November 30, 2000, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11302000 t1130asd.html.
61See id. at 18.
62See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Brieng 4, September 28, 2000, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2000/t09282000 t0928asd.html.
63See Jim Garamone, DoD Slows Anthrax Vaccination Program Again, American Forces Information Service, June 11, 2001,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/n06112001 200106112.html.
64See U.S. Department of Defense, Brieng on the Anthrax Vaccination and Immunization Program 2, (De-
cember 13, 1999)(statement of Dr. Sue Bailey, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Aairs), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t121419999 t213anth.html.
65See Jim Garamone, DoD Slows Anthrax Vaccination Program Again, American Forces Information Service, June 11, 2001,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/n06112001 200106112.html.
66See id.
67See The National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine, Anthrax Vaccine is Use-
ful But Shortcomings Underscore Need for Replacement 2 (March 6, 2002), available at
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309083095?OpenDocument.
11vaccine.
Interrupting the anthrax vaccination program for lack of vaccine may cause other problems. Since the
anthrax vaccine is approved only for use on a particular schedule of six inoculations, with a yearly booster
shot thereafter, suspending the vaccination program means that some participants in the anthrax vaccination
program may have received only a partial schedule of shots or received shots later than recommended. The
Defense Department's response to reader mail on its anthrax vaccination website conrms that this has
occurred.68 It is not yet known what health eects interrupting an anthrax vaccination schedule will have.69
It is also not known whether the vaccine will remain eective.70 This might cause some who have received
partial vaccination schedules to be lack caution when exposed to anthrax because they think they are
protected. Finally, deviations from the schedule have not yet been approved by FDA.71
What Went Wrong
BioPort failed numerous inspections, mostly on grounds of improper sterilization procedures.72 BioPort only
gained the approval of the FDA to release the latest batch of AVA after it hired a subcontractor, Hollister-
Stier, to bottle its vaccine in sterile vials.73 The General Accounting Oce, in a study requested by the
House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Aairs, and International Relations, also found that
68See \Angela" from DoD AVIP Agency, Response to \Colonel Z", visited on March 10, 2002, available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/reader mail/Mail/091001.htm.
69See Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D., Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, FDA, Letter to Sue Bailey, M.D.,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Aairs, September 29, 1999, and Jane E. Henney, M.D., Commissioner of Food and
Drugs, Letter to Sue Bailey, M.D., September 28, 1999, available at http://www.fda.gov.
70See id.
71See id.
72See, e.g., Paula A. Trost, Marsha W. Major, and William D. Tingley. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service, Food and Drug Administration. Form FDA 483 for BioPort Corporation 4. October 26, 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov/.
73See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Approves License Supplements for Anthrax Vaccine, January 31, 2002,
available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2002/NEW00792.html.
12BioPort had changed its manufacturing processes numerous times without reporting these changes to the
FDA.74 This was a violation of FDA regulations on good manufacturing practices.75 The GAO found that
in some cases, these changes aected the antigen content of the vaccine, but was unable to state whether
this change would lead to greater adverse reactions.76 In testimony before a House Subcommittee, Nancy
Kingsbury of the GAO recommended that either the FDA or the Defense Department, or both, institute \an
aggressive active surveillance program to ensure the early identication and analysis of adverse reactions."77
74See Kingsbury, supra note 16.
75See Kingsbury, supra note 16, at 2, citing 21 C.F.R. xx 600-680.
76See Kingsbury, supra note 16.
77See Kingsbury, supra note 16, at 8.
13The biggest problem was probably that the State of Michigan had
torn down its old facility and begun to build a new one.78 According
to the Defense Department, this was not due to any action on the
part of the FDA but rather in response to the increased production
capacity required by the Defense Department.79 As the company
was using a new facility to manufacture the vaccine, the company
then had to go through the entire FDA approval process to obtain a
new licensing supplement for that facility.80 In December of 1999,
the Defense Department was estimating that this entire process
could be done in six months to a year.81
As a small business, BioPort had few other sources of income besides the anthrax vaccine. A statement by
BioPort corporation explains that it gave up its other products to make sure the company was \focused"
on the anthrax vaccine.82 However, an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency found that BioPort
was losing money on its other commercial products, which might endanger its ability to continue producing
anthrax vaccine.83 A Defense Department background brieng states that BioPort was not even expected to
make a prot o the anthrax vaccine sold to the Defense Department, even after the contract renegotiation.84
Furthermore, an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency found that BioPort's accounting system was
insucient for dealing with government contracts.85 The company did correct the deciencies, but the
78See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Brieng 19, November 30, 2000, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11302000 t1130asd.html.
79See Department of Defense, Anthrax Vaccine|Production Issues 1, visited on March 10, 2002, available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/qna/PRODISSUES.HTM.
80See Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D., Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Statement Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Armed Services, July 12, 2000, available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2000/anthraxvaccine2.html.
81See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Brieng 2 (December 13, 1999)(statement of Dr. Sue Bailey, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Aairs), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t12131999 t213anth.html.
82BioPort Corporation, Media Backgrounder, November 20, 2001, available at http://www.bioport.com/NewsRoom/NewsReleases/BioPort/2001-Nov20.asp.
83See Hearing on Audits of BioPort Corporation, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Military
Personnel Subcommittee 4 (2000)(statement of April G. Stephenson, Chief, Policy Programs Division, Defense Contract Audit
Agency).
84See U.S. Department of Defense, Background Brieng: Anthrax Vaccine Contract Brieng 11(August 5, 1999)(statement
of unnamed briefer), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1999/x08051888 x0805ant.html.
85See Hearing on Audits of BioPort Corporation, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Military
Personnel Subcommittee 7-8 (2000)(statement of April G. Stephenson, Chief, Policy Programs Division, Defense Contract
14problems with the accounting system had meant that neither BioPort nor DCAA really knew how much it
cost to produce the anthrax vaccine.86
FDA's Response to the Shortage
The FDA could have taken two special regulatory actions to relieve the anthrax vaccine shortage. First of
all, despite the problems with the supply of anthrax vaccine, the FDA never declared a drug shortage of
anthrax vaccine.87 If a drug shortage were declared, the FDA policy is that it must be addressed whenever
possible.88 The FDA does recognize that its own enforcement actions, among other factors, may lead to a
drug shortage.89 Potential drug shortage situations arise about once or twice per month, according to the
FDA's drug shortage coordinator.90 The FDA considers drug shortages to be of a high priority if the drug
is considered to be \medically necessary."91 The anthrax vaccine certainly ought to be considered medically
necessary for the prevention of anthrax, even though anthrax is relatively rare in this country. Furthermore,
regardless of whether anthrax vaccine should be considered a medical necessity, it is a necessity for the
national defense. Since terrorist acts involving anthrax are by nature unpredictable, the vaccine may still be
necessary for defense preparedness even if the FDA assesses the medical risk at any given time and nds it
to be minimal. As has been seen above, the FDA did not take action to stop a drug shortage with anthrax
vaccine until the situation became a crisis. It may be necessary to take congressional action in order to
Audit Agency).
86See id.
87See Food and Drug Administration, Drug Shortages, January 29, 2002, available at http://www.fda.gov/.
88See Michael G. Friedman, Lead Deputy Commissioner of FDA, Statement Before the House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on Human Resources, May 7, 1998, available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/immune.htm.
89See Hearing on Audits of BioPort Corporation, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Military
Personnel Subcommittee 7-8 (2000)(statement of April G. Stephenson, Chief, Policy Programs Division, Defense Contract
Audit Agency).
90See Tamar Nordenburg, Inside FDA: When A Drug Is In Short Supply, FDA Consumer, November-December 1997,
available at http://www.fda.gov/.
91Food and Drug Administration, Drug Shortages, January 29, 2002, available at http://www.fda.gov/.
15mandate FDA consideration of national defense issues in additional to medical necessity.
Another possible response to the lack of anthrax vaccine could be to designate the anthrax vaccine an orphan
drug. The anthrax vaccine is not currently designated as an orphan drug.92 One barrier to designating the
drug as an orphan drug is that it must be applied for prior to marketing the product.93 If the vaccine had
been designated as an orphan drug, government funds could have been made available for clinical testing
of the vaccine, in the amount of one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand dollars per year.94 A tax
credit would also be available for additional clinical testing.95 Although this is a relatively small amount
of money compared to the large amounts needed to get BioPort up and running again, it might have been
helpful to BioPort while it was having nancial diculties.
However, what was really needed from the FDA in this situation was quick, responsive FDA action in review-
ing BioPort's attempts to comply with FDA's prior comments. An FDA press release states that BioPort
is already receiving expedited treatment from FDA. The press release quotes Bernard A. Schwetz, DVM,
Ph.D., FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, as stating, \FDA has worked as quickly as possible
to review these license supplements, including resolving outstanding issues with the rm, for the supplement
to be approved."96 According to BioPort, BioPort Corporation led the necessary documentation for its
supplemental Biologic License Amendment on October 12, 2001.97 The FDA completed its pre-approval
inspection of the BioPort facility on December 19, 2001, and approved BioPort's facility on December 27,
2001.98 FDA then inspected Hollister-Stier's facility during the period of January 7-10, 2002 and approved
92See Food and Drug Administration, List of Orphan Designations and Approvals, visited on February 27, 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/orphan/DESIGNAT/list.htm.
93See Food and Drug Administration, OOPD Frequently Asked Questions, visited on February 27, 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/orphan/faq/index.htm.
94See id.
95See Food and Drug Administration, Tax Credit for Testing Expenses for Drugs for Rare Diseases or Conditions, visited on
February 27, 2002, available at http://www.fda.gov/orphan/taxcred.htm.
96See Food and Drug Administration, Press Release, January 31, 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2002/NEW000792.html.
97See BioPort Corporation, Media Backgrounder, November 20, 2001, available at http://www.bioport.com.
98See Food and Drug Administration, Press Release, January 31, 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2002/NEW000792.html.
16Hollister-Stier's facility on January 31, 2002. The military's entire supply of AVA would have been expired
for over two weeks before FDA completed even the rst inspection of BioPort. The delay of two months in
inspecting the facility is completely unexplained.
FDA policies with regards to dealing with drug shortages, such as the Fast Track Designation Request
program, are mostly focused on getting new drugs approved.99 Such policies do not deal with helping the
manufacturer overcome manufacturing problems which might cause a shortage. While the problem of slow
FDA approval for new drugs is certainly important, solving it would not prevent what happened at BioPort
because the anthrax vaccine had already been approved for thirty years. What was really needed from the
FDA is quicker responses to the manufacturer's attempts to correct manufacturing problems.
The FDA should not, however, adopt any special standards for evaluating the anthrax vaccine which give
special consideration to the importance of anthrax vaccine for national defense. While the FDA assisted
in evaluating reports of adverse eects after the vaccine has been administered and reviewed a draft of the
Defense Department's vaccination program, the agency was not involved with Defense Department procure-
ment of the vaccine.100 While the expertise of FDA ocials in biological products would certainly have been
useful in avoiding manufacturing delays, having FDA ocials too involved in the Defense Department pro-
curement process for anthrax vaccine presents problems of its own. Since the anthrax vaccination program is
so controversial, Defense Department ocials have often pointed to the independence of FDA inspectors in
order to assure the public and members of the services that the vaccine is safe.101 If FDA became involved in
assuring a consistent supply of vaccine to the Defense Department, it might be considered to have a political
stake in ensuring adequate supplies and thus jeopardize its credibility with members of the public as to the
vaccine's safety. Therefore, while the FDA needs to speed up its own procedures to ensure that critical
99See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. x 506 (1997).
100See Hearing on the Anthrax Vaccine, Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 13, 2000 (written statement of the Food
and Drug Administration), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2000/anthraxvaccine.html
101See, e.g., Department of Defense, Vaccine Safety, visited on March 13, 2002, available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/safety/safety info.htm.
17inspections are done immediately, it should not relax its standards in any way in evaluating the product.
BioPort's Response to the Shortage
Despite the problems with the FDA's response, the fact that BioPort waited until October to le the
application for the licensing supplement is even more problematic. The company would have known that
the military's supply of AVA was due to expire the next month. In 2000, the FDA set the following
goals for reviewing manufacturing supplements to license applications as part of the re-authorization of the
Prescription Drug Manufacturing Act of 1992 (PDUFA):
The time frame for priority applications and clinical ecacy supplements and for manu-
facturing supplements that do not contain clinical data and do not require prior approval
will continue to be 6 months. The time frame for manufacturing supplements that do not
contain clinical data but do require prior approval will become 4 months over the time of
PDUFA 2. Complete review comments are communicated to the applicant in an action let-
ter, which stops the review clock. Other comments not constituting a complete review may
be transmitted in an information request (IR) or discipline review (DR). Neither an IR nor
a DR stops the review clock. Responses to an IR or DR, and unsolicited information may
be received from the applicant during the review of an application or supplement. These
submissions are amendments to the pending le. Each submission to a pending application
is assessed for its eect on the review clock. Receipt of a major amendment to an application
within three months of the action due date will extend the action due date by three months.
Minor amendments will not aect the due date.102
The FDA has also committed to reviewing a manufacturer's response to an action letter following the
resubmission of a licensing application in six months.103 What is important to realize is that these periods
of times, as long as they are, are still only goals. The fact that the FDA had to set these goals suggests
that the usual time frame was even longer. Therefore, leaving such a short amount of time for the licensing
103See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration,
Procedures for the Classication of Resubmissions of an Application for a Product Covered by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA),
May 20, 1998 (SOPP 8405.1), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/regsopp/84051.htm.
18application to clear the FDA was clearly unrealistic. In the company's defense, the ling that it sent to FDA
in October weighed between seven and eight thousand pounds.104 However, this was all the more reason for
the company to leave the FDA as much time as possible to review it. Furthermore, if the company's license
amendment was rejected again, there was no reason to believe that new batches could be quickly prepared
before the Department of Defense ran out of vaccine altogether. It takes 22 weeks to prepare a new batch
of vaccine, ve of which are devoted to FDA batch release.105 If the FDA had found that the company was
still using improper manufacturing processes, therefore, it would have taken ve and a half months to make
new batches|after whatever manufacturing problems the FDA were to nd were xed. This is a signicant
risk.
This problem should not be treated as a mere coincidence, but inherent in the structure of the situation.
BioPort, as the country's sole manufacturer of the vaccine, has little to fear in terms of losing its contract
with the military to a competitor in the short term. Therefore, it does not have the incentive to ensure
that the military's vaccine supply is always up to date. The Defense Department, which does have the
incentive to maintain an up-to-date supply of vaccine, is unable to apply for the supplements on BioPort's
behalf. Therefore it may be anticipated that similar problems will occur in the future unless corrective action
is taken. The Defense Department should require in its contract with the vaccine manufacturer that the
manufacturer le any necessary FDA approvals several months before their supply is due to run out.
In fact, it is possible that these problems could have been anticipated months or even years earlier. On May
21, 2001, BioPort issued a press release stating that it expected to complete all of its FDA approvals in \early
2002."106 This was already a problem given that the current supply of the anthrax vaccine was due to expire
104See BioPort Corporation, Did You Know?, available at http://www.bioport.com.
105See The National Academy of Sciences, The Anthrax Vaccine: Is It Safe? Does It Work? 139-140 (2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/030983095/html/50.html.
106BioPort Corporation, Press Release, May 21, 2002, available at http://www.bioport.com/NewsRoom/NewsReleases/BioPort/2001-
May21.asp.
19in late 2001. It should have been apparent to the Defense Department at this time that, according to the
manufacturer's own representations, the manufacturer was probably not capable of assuring it a consistent
supply of vaccine.
Duplication of the facilities during construction could have been an important preventive measure to avoid
shortages of the vaccine. One Defense Department ocial asserted that the old plant would need to be
burned once the new one was completed.107 If the old building would need to be destroyed, this would
indeed be expensive. However, this is perhaps a false cost savings, considering the number of lives at stake
if the military were to experience an anthrax attack.
The Defense Department's Response to the Shortage
In 1999, the Defense Department restructured its contract with BioPort in order to \preserve the nancial
viability of BioPort in order to ensure uninterrupted production of the anthrax vaccine."108 According to a
Defense Department news release, \[i]n June 1999, BioPort requested extraordinary contractual relief under
Public Law 85-804 because it had insucient cash to continue operations after August 1 and was unable
to borrow additional funds."109 Even after receiving extraordinary contractual relief, an audit of BioPort
found that BioPort was still having cash ow problems in early 2000.110
The Defense Department granted extraordinary contractual relief in order to keep BioPort from going into
107See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Brieng 15 (December 13, 1999)(statement of
Mr. David Oliver, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t12131999 t213anth.html.
108U.S. Department of Defense, News Release 1, August 5, 1999, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1999/b08051999 bt367-
99.html.
109Id.
110See Hearing on Audits of BioPort Corporation, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Military
Personnel Subcommittee 4-5 (2000)(statement of April G. Stephenson, Chief, Policy Programs Division, Defense Contract
Audit Agency).
20bankruptcy.111 A bankruptcy could have been even more disastrous for delivery of the anthrax vaccine, even
if the rm kept operating instead of liquidating. In the event of bankruptcy, besides waiting for the FDA to
release batches of the vaccine, the Defense Department might have had the additional burden of persuading
a bankruptcy judge to lift the automatic stay placed upon most creditors at the time of a bankruptcy ling,
which would prevent it from collecting units of vaccine which it had paid for but not received pre-ling.112
If the FDA ever takes enforcement action in the future which adversely aects the supply of Anthrax Vaccine
Adsorbed available, delays of the length seen here will not be acceptable. The FDA has set the new expiration
date for the new batches lled at Hollister-Stier at eighteen months from the date of manufacture.113 The
expiration date can only be extended with \the submission [to the FDA] of supporting data as a supplement
to your biologics license application for review and approval."114 Such \review and approval" will take time,
both for the manufacturer to research the data and prepare the documentation and for the FDA to perform
its review and reach a decision. Therefore, FDA and the Defense Department cannot expect that last-minute
action will be acceptable. There may not be time to wait until a batch of vaccine is rejected close to the
expiration date. The manufacturer will need to begin preparing the extension request several months before
the expiration date of the military's cache of anthrax vaccine. The FDA could demand this, as a condition
of approving the batch releases or the Defense Department could have it written into its contract with the
manufacturing facilities. Congress can also mandate that certain vaccines be given expedited review by
FDA.
111See Hearing on Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee 7 (April 13, 2000)(statement of Rudy de Leon, Deputy Secretary of Defense), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2000/s20000413-depsecdef.html.
112See 11 U.S.C. x 362.
113See Steven A. Masiello, Director of the Oce of Compliance and Biologics Quality, Food and Drug
Administration, Letter to Lallan Giri, Ph.D., BioPort Corporation, dated January 31, 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/products/biopava0131021.htm.
114Id. at 1.
21The Department of Defense must also examine whether it is realistic to expect private enterprise to take
over the manufacture of this vaccine. The State of Michigan estimated at the time of sale that it had been
underwriting the manufacture of the vaccine sold to the Defense Department in the amount of approximately
$5 million per year. 115 A Defense Department brieng, not on the record, stated that BioPort had not
realized that Michigan was previously providing state janitorial services and utilities, for example, which
were not accounted for in the price it was charging the State Department for anthrax vaccine.116
Currently, many vaccines are in short supply due to the lack of incentives to produce them in the private
sector.117 In testimony before a Senate committee, Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense stated that \major pharmaceutical rms typically
expect their products to produce in excess of $200 million in annual sales. At most, the Defense Depart-
ment will provide a small piece of this revenue expectation."118 Dr. Johnson-Winegar also noted that
vaccine manufacture requires expensive facilities dedicated to one product, manufacturers often nd them-
selves blindsided by political changes, and that manufacturers had concerns the potential for monitoring
by international weapons inspectors which might disclose trade secrets.119 The State of Michigan began
manufacturing anthrax vaccine in the rst place at the request of the Department of Defense because no
private manufacturer was willing to take it on.120
The government is currently considering whether to build its own anthrax vaccine production plant.121 This,
115See U.S. Department of Defense, Background Brieng: Anthrax Vaccine Contract Brieng 8(August 5, 1999)(statement of
unnamed briefer), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1999/x08051888 x0805ant.html.
116See id. at 6-7.
117See Richard Klausner, Special Adviser, President for Counterterrorism Council of the Institute of Medicine, Prepared
Testimony Before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Federal News Service (February 5, 2002),
available via Lexis-Nexis.
118Field Hearing on Department of Defense Anti-Biological Warfare Agent Vaccine Acquisition Program at Pine Blu,
Arkansas, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel 3 (2000)(statement by Dr.
Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense).
119See id. at 3-4.
120See BioPort Corporation, Media Backgrounder, November 20, 2001, available at
http://www.bioport.com/NewsRoom/NewsReleases/BioPort/2001-Nov20.asp.
121See Emmett George, Arkansans Pitch Arsenal Site to Rumsfeld, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 26, 2002, at B6.
22however, is estimated to cost much more than working with BioPort. Senator Tim Hutchinson estimates
that building a government plant will cost $386 million, versus the $120 million that the government has
already spent on BioPort.122 The plant will also take a number of years to construct and gain FDA approval.
Although more expensive, it would, however, solve many of the problems associated with private production
of vaccines, such as the possibility of a private company running into nancial diculty.
It is uncertain whether, without changes in the law, a government-owned plant would be able to completely
avoid the laws which allow FDA to regulate its manufacturing facilities. A government entity might plausibly
be able to get around some parts of the Public Health Services Act by claiming that it was not introducing
the product into interstate commerce. For instance, the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. x 262(a)
states that \No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any biological
product unless...a biologics license is in eect for the biological product."123 However, a federal district
court case refused to extend the interstate commerce language of Section 262(a) to other parts of Section
262, and thus ruled that Section 262(b), which deals with false labeling, to apply regardless of whether the
product was introduced into interstate commerce.124 If this reasoning were followed by other courts, Section
262(c), which allows the FDA to inspect biologics production facilities, and Section 262(d), which allows
FDA to recall unsafe biological products, would apply to products produced by, for instance, the Defense
Department, and thus still allow FDA some measure of control over the product.125
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, a similar result obtains. Although the FDA chooses to do its
biologics enforcement under the Public Health Services Act, the FD&C Act is applicable to biologics.126
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the \good manufacturing practices" required under the FD&C
122See Harold Kennedy, Chem-Bio Attack Looming, Say U.S. Ocials: According to Sen. Tim Hutchinson, \The Unthinkable Has Become Thinkable,"
National Defense, March 1, 2002, at 18.
12342 U.S.C. x 262(a).
124See United States v. Calise, 217 F.Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), citing 42 U.S.C. xx 262(a) and (b).
125See 42 U.S.C. xx 262(c) and (d).
126See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Frequently Asked Questions, January 17, 2001, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq.htm.
23Act only apply to those drugs which are shipped in interstate commerce.127 However, other provisions of the
FD&C Act, such as the provision which requires all producers of drugs to register, and which prohibits them
from refusing inspection, are applicable to all drugs regardless of whether they enter interstate commerce.128
The inspectors themselves are not authorized to inspect drugs unless they are intended for interstate com-
merce.129 Nevertheless, the agency would probably not want to be involved in litigating this matter.
Vaccine could even be manufactured by the Department of Health and Human Services under Section 42
U.S.C. x 263, which states that \[t]he Service [The Public Health Service, now the Department of Health
and Human Services] may prepare any [biological] product...for the use of other Federal Departments or
agencies, and public or private agencies and individuals engaged in work in the eld of medicine when such
product is not available from establishments licensed under such section."130 The language of this section,
\from establishments licensed under such section," suggests that such a facility would not need to be li-
censed.131 However, the wholesale transfer of the preparation of an important biological product from the
private sector to the Department of Health and Human Services would likely be seen as a conict of inter-
est for the FDA and perhaps undermine public condence in the fairness of FDA's regulation of biological
products.
Regardless of whether a government agency producing anthrax vaccine has the ability to sidestep FDA reg-
ulation, it is unlikely that such an agency would choose to do so. Special treatment for biological products
manufactured by the government might arouse public fears that the products were less safe. Therefore,
regardless of whether an agency making vaccines chose to accept FDA regulation or had it imposed upon
them by the law, a government plant might still be unable to release vaccine at some point in the future due
to actions by FDA.
127See 21 U.S.C. x 351(a)(1)(B) and 21 U.S.C. x 331(a).
128See 21 U.S.C. xx 351(p) and (q)(1) and 21 U.S.C. x 360.
129See 21 U.S.C. x 374.
13042 U.S.C. x 263.
131Id.
24Therefore, the government would need to focus on having an alternative source of vaccine in case one plant
was unable to distribute vaccine due to FDA enforcement actions. The most secure option would be to
have two plants, both constantly producing the anthrax vaccine, in order to avoid any start-up delays if one
plant has problems. While a government plant would create an alternative to BioPort, it is possible that no
private plant would be able to compete with it. The business press has speculated about whether BioPort
would be able to remain in existence if a government plant were built.132 Therefore, the government would
need to make sure that both plants could reasonably be expected to stay in existence, either by encouraging
two private-sector plants, perhaps with government subsidies if necessary, or by providing two government
plants.
Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson has stated that BioPort is expected to produce
two million doses of the anthrax vaccine this year and three to eight million next year.133 However, Dr.
David S.C. Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, estimates that the military will
unable to extend the vaccination program to all its personnel for two or three years at least even if BioPort
performs at expected levels.134
Conclusion
At the time of writing of this paper, the Defense Department is currently considering whether to continue
132See, e.g., Kristen Philipkoski, Why Anthrax Vaccine is Scarce, Wired News, October 10, 2001, available at wysi-
wyg://7/http://www.wired.com/news/conict/0,2100,47410,00.html.
133See Associated Press, A Nation Challenged: The Vaccine Maker; Troubled Company Is Allowed To Resume Making Vaccine,
The New York Times, February 1, 2002, at A13.
134See Hearing on the Defense Authorization Request for 2003 Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee
on Personnel, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of the Honorable David S.C. Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness), available at LEXIS, News Library, FDCH File.
25the anthrax vaccination program and if so, the scope of the program.135 Nonetheless, the President's Budget
for 2003 includes stockpiling an improved anthrax vaccine and smallpox vaccine for civilian use.136 In order
to stockpile these vaccines, a consistent supply of vaccines from the manufacturers will be needed in order
to avoid the expiration date problem set out above. Shortages like the recent anthrax vaccine shortage can
be avoided by careful long-range planning involving FDA, the manufacturers and whichever government
agencies are responsible for purchasing the vaccines.
135See U.S. Department of Defense, Anthrax Vaccine Announcement Expected Within the Month 1 (February 26, 2002), avail-
able on LEXIS, News Library, FDCH File.
136See Oce of the White House Press Secretary, Defending Against Biological Terrorism, Press Release, February 5, 2002,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020205-1.html.
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